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INTERSTATE DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS

FROM THE FEDERAL BUDGETARY PROCESSI
ROY W. BAHL* AND J. J. WARFORD**
ABSTRACT

It is generally agreed that a major ob-

jective
The objective of this paper is to provide
a of federal grant policy is to encourage states to increase the level of partheoretical framework for examining interticular services and to aid the financing
state variations in the benefits which accrue

of national minimum programs for certain
from the federal budgetary process. Unlike
activities.
most traditional analyses, which center
on This implies the desire to achieve
a greater degree of income equality among
the relative magnitude of net monetary
states, a consequence of which is that ex
flows between the federal and state governpost evaluation of the geographic effects
ments, this paper incorporates consideraof federal aid has almost always concention of both a broader definition of federaltrated on the relationship bewteen per
aid and the notion of interstate variations
capita
in the opportunity cost of making use
of grants and per capita income. Previous empirical studies of this kind have
federal funds.
suggested that the distributional impact of
Empirical estimates of such a benefit
federal
distribution are presented, but the
as- grants-in-aid has become more inthrough time.1 However,
sumptions required to permit testingcome-equalizing
are

either through oversight or because the
necessarily heroic. Nevertheless, the subauthors of the studies have been unwilling
stantial difference betwen the interstate
make crude estimates when confronted
distribution of benefits as defined intothis
with severe data difficulties, federal aspaper, and that of net monetary flows,

sistance has been subject to a particularly
suggests that the latter is likely to present
narrow definition.
a better picture of the intentions of budget-makers than of the real effectsAof
fundamental weakness is that attempts
budgetary policy.
to determine the interstate impact of the

federal budgetary process have always
implicitly assumed full employment of

I. Introduction

resources. This in turn implies a failure to

'"THIS paper examines interstate varia- distinguish between market and shadow
ations in the benefits accruing from prices, or between real and purely monethe federal budgetary process, the inten- tary effects, which necessarily diverge if
tion being to demonstrate that traditional states operate at varying degrees of ca-

analyses of federal assistance fail to de- pacity utilization. As a corollary of this,

scribe the true distribtuion of benefits.

the focus of such studies has traditionally

Our specific objective is to provide a

theoretical framework for calculating an 'For example, see Howard G. Schaller, "Fed-

array of benefits, incorporating both eral
a

Grants-in-Aid and Differences in State

broader definition of federal aid and the
notion of interstate variations in the op-

Per Capita Income," National Tax Journal, September 1955, pp. 287-99; Mark A. Haskell,

funds.

visory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-

"Federal Grants and the Income-Density Ef-

portunity cost of making use of federal fect," National Tax Journal, March 1962; Ad-

tions, The Role of Equalization in Federal
Grants (Washington, D.C., Government Print-

*The views expressed in this paper are our

ing Office, January 1964), p. 63; and Roy

own.

* International Monetary Fund
** International Bank for Reconstruction and

Bahl and Robert Saunders, "Factors Associated

With Variations in State and Local Govern-

ment Spending," Journal of Finance, Septem-

ber 1966.

Development
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170 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
been on monetary flows of federal
grantseral funds
is, relative to their ultimate
in-aid (and sometimes of federal
impact,taxes2),
a somewhat haphazard affair. Failto the neglect of direct federal
on
ureoutlays
to consider
effects beyond the nomigoods and services.3 This paper
addresses
nal, or
monetary, flow of funds between
both of these issues.4 In some
ways,
states
and thethe
federal government is therefollowing analysis parallels that
Engerforeof
likely
to present a better picture of
man in his 1965 paper, "Regional
Aspectsof budget-makers than of
the intentions
of Stabilization Policy."5 Engerman
dem- of budgetary policy.
the real effects
onstrates the importance of interregional
interdependence in determining
unII. Astate
Model of
Federal Assistance Benefits

employment rates, and the implications

In defining the net benefits of the flow
this has for the efficiency of stabilization

of because
federal funds
policy. Just as we argue that
of to states, a distinction

variation in the economic characteristics

of the various states nominal flows of

is drawn between the nature of the benefits of grants-in-aid to, and direct federal

in, the recipient state. It is
funds are an inadequate guide as to expenditures
the

assumed here that whereas federal grants
ultimate distribution of benefits, Enger-

are designed to supply a commodity or
man s position is that because the per

service of direct intrinsic value to the
dollar impact of federal budgetary policy
inhabitants of the recipient state, federal
varies by region, federal stabilization policy shoud be more regionally-oriented. expenditures are generally on items which
confer indirect benefits only. Thus a miliSection II below indicates the paratary installation, not of particular intrinsic

meters that need to be incorporated in
a to the state in which it is located,
value
may confer a benefit by providing em-

calculation intended to trace the net effective incidence of federal aid to states.
In Section III we demonstrate the rank-

ployment for resources that would other-

wise be idle, whereas a grant for sewer

ings of states according to the per capita
construction provides both types of benenet benefits they obtain from the budge-fit.

tary process under a number of assump- Unfortunately, the distinction between
tions concerning these parameters. Un-federal grants-in-aid and direct federal
fortunately, present knowledge of the acexpenditures is not always so clear. For
tual values of the parameters is limited,example, grants-in-aid for an interstate
and the assumptions required to permithighway program may not be of exclusive
empirical testing are necessarily heroic.benefit to the inhabitants of the state.
Nevertheless, the substantial difference
Conversely, federal expenditures, say, on
in benefit distribution, when benefits are
a certain type of water resource developredefined as in our theoretical model,
ment, may have an intrinsic net value to

suggests that the present allocation of fed-the inhabitants of that state. This would

2See James A. Maxwell, Financing State and occur, for example, if a price that recovers less than total costs is levied. HowLocal Governments (Washington, D.C., The
Brookings Institution, 1965), pp. 61-66.
ever, our justification for making the dis-

tinction is the usual rationale for the

'An exception is to be found in Selma Mushkin, "Federal Grants and Federal Expenditures," federal government's assumption of direct
National Tax Journal , September 1957, pp.
responsibility, namely, that the benefits
193-213.

(costs) of undertaking (not undertaking)

an investment spillover to such an extent
4 We made some attempt to remedy this deficiency in our "Real and Monetary Dimensions
that identification with a particular govof Federal Aid to States," a paper presented ernmental
at
unit is not possible.
the Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Despite the spillover effect normally
Association (Special Session on the Grants
associated with federal expenditures, not
Economy), New York, December 1969.
only grants to but also expenditures within
their constituencies are eagerly sought by
bilization Policy" in R. A. Musgrave (editor),
state and local authorities. This is recogEssays in Fiscal Federalism, The Brookings Innition of the fact that both are a form of
stitution, 1965.
GStanley Engerman, "Regional Aspects of Sta-

This content downloaded from 131.96.28.155 on Wed, 19 Oct 2022 19:14:12 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

No. 2 J DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS 171

federal assistance. The So
model
developed
if the
unemployment rate in

here therefore provides aisframework
fornet employment
10 per cent, the
benefit of a $100 netin
inflow
of federal
including grants and expenditures
the
definition of the net benefits
resulting
grant funds, all
of which is spent within
from the budgetary process.
the state, is $10, i.e., the opportunity cost

of using the $100 for local production is
the $90 of production foregone in some
other sector. If the marginal propensity

Federal Grants /Taxes

Treating the incidence of federal taxes
to import from other states is «, the
as a negative grant, two types of net beneemployment benefit is defined as
fit to recipient states may be distinguished.

First, there is an intrinsic
value benefit,
(M-T)
(l-«)y6 (3)
which as argued below is a function of
So,other
in the
above examp
real resource imports from
states,
ginal propensity
to impor
and second, there is an employment
beneployment
becom
fit which varies inversely
with the benefit
opfigure
will
in practice b
portunity cost of utilizing
federal
refederal tax incidence is treated here as a

sources.

negative grant), it may be interpreted as
that amount
of resource imports from
Employment effect. To illustrate
the naother
states
which is foregone because of
ture of the employment effect,
let
us suptheto
budgetary
Hence states with
pose that a federal grant-in-aid
a state process.
is
relatively
lower negative (M-T) values
used entirely to purchase goods
and servare "better off."
ices from sources within that state (i.e.,

the marginal propensity to import from
other states is zero). If there is absolutely

Import effect. We have suggested that

where resources are fully employed in a
full employment within that state, we
recipient state, it is possible to obtain
take the position that the grant would
a net increase in real benefits only by
confer no benefit to inhabitants of the

recipient state. There will simply be a

taking advantage of out-of-state purchases.

This is measured by a (M-T), which repshuffling around of resources but no net
resents the change in out-of-state purgain will result.
chases resulting from federal budgetary
It is therefore clear that if R is the
policy. These purchases may or may not
real or opportunity cost of local resources
be on goods or services directly related
employed in making use of the grant, the
to the initial purpose of the federal aid.7
maximum benefit would be realized if
(The very important question of whether
at the margin R = 0, i.e., when the factorsor not federal grants-in-aid augment or reemployed would otherwise be idle. On aplace intrastate expenditures on particular
statewide basis, the opportunity cost ofitems does not concern us here).

employing factors to implement a net The total of out-of-state imports genfederal grant of amount (M-T) can beerated by federal assistance must be di-

estimated roughly as

vided among the states as exports.8 These

R=(M - T) (1-y) (1)

°Ideally, of course, any calculation using
this expression should add imports from outwhere M = federal grant-in-aid
side the U.S. to imports from other states.
T = federal tax incidence (treated
7The existence of an employment or an imhere as a negative
grant)
port effect requires the assumption that rey = rate of unemployment
of
sources are not idle for
structural reasons, or
state resources

that there are not interstate variations in the

percent of the labor force which is structurally

An initial benefit derived from
unemployed.
putting
Clearly this assumption is ques-

hitherto idle resources to work will therefore be

(M - T)-R= (M - T)y (2)

tionable, but because of the illustrative objectives of the empirical portion of this study,

it is retained.

8Assuming away international trade effects.
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will have an employment-generating ef-

^ B

fect of the kind described earlier, as long

2 (ïq^î,
as excess capacity is presentBj
in=the
ex-

j = l,2,...,48 (7)

porting state. Then the total effect of in-

tere state trade which is induced
by
theappropriate rate of diswhere r
= the

budgetary process for the jth count
state, is

^(Mj - Tj) + yXj (4)

Then equation (7) gives a basis for c
paring the interstate variations in

benefits which result from a given pat
Federal Expenditures
of grants, direct expenditures, and tax
Total direct federal expenditures may be

treated in a parallel fashion to that deInterstate Variations
in Real Ben
scribed above, given our III.
assumption
that
Assumptions
and
Estimates
these outlays result in no increase in intrinsic value. Moreover, there
no first
In theis
section
below, the following
round trade effect associated with direct
sumptions are made:
federal expenditures because it is assumed • The marginal propensity to consu
is the same for all states as is the rate of
that these inflows are remitted directly
discount.
to payment recipients, contractors, etc.
(See below, page 173.) Therefore, direct • The marginal propensities to consume
federal expenditures exert only an employ-and import, rates of discount, and unment-generating effect in the first in-employment rates are invariate over time.
stance, i.e., direct federal expenditures of
• Total exports are equal to total imamount E generate employment equivalent
ports for each period considered, and each
to Ey.
states proportionate share of exports is
maintained over time.

Total Model

Estimates are made of the following:
From the above, the total benefit flow
yj the rate at which resources are unto the jth state in any time period may be
employed
viewed as the sum of the trade effect for
net grants, the employment effect for net «j the marginal propensity to import
grants, and the employment effect of di- Xj exports resulting from the federal
rect federal expenditures, i.e., 'first round'budgetary process
r the rate of discount

benefits for the jth state are

Bji = aj(Mj - T,) + (yj - ajyj) (Mj - Tj)

+yjEj+yjXji (5)

The rate of unemployment. The per-

cent of labor force unemployed is used as

an estimate of y. No attempt is made to

deal with
the thorny
issue of idle indusIn each successive round, the
amount
availtrial capacity.
able for importing resources
from other
states is equal to total real benefits from
Marginal propensity to import, and exthe preceding round, i.e., the import trade

port share. There is little empirical evieffect after round one for state j is (aj)

dence on interstate trade, so any estimate
(Bj,m). Similarly, the employment-generatof interstate differences in the marginal
ing effect in later rounds is also based on

propensity to import (a) must of necestotal benefits in the preceding round.
sity be crude. Haveman and Krutilla9
Hence for state j in year t total benefits
have estimated, by region, the fraction of
may be described as
durable goods requirements for dam con-

struction which is imported from other
Bj,t = -f- (yj - ajyj)Bj,t-i+yjXj,t

t>l
The
A

state j (Bj) is

(6)

present

9Robert H. Haveman and John V. Krutilla,
Unemployment , Idle Capacity, and Evaluation
of
Public Expenditures
publishedtotal
for Resources
value
of

for the Future by the Johns Hopkins Press
(Baltimore, 1968).
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v x»- - r 48 n

regions. Purely for purposes of illustra-

tion, and aware of the grave
v x»- - shortcomings
48 2 «i(Mi-Ti)

of this measure, we have taken
2 8i ithe
= lap(9)
propriate regional coefficient as an estii= i L^jregional
mate of a for each state. The
figures are shown in Table 1.
and later round exports as

Table 1. Interstate Trade and Export Share
v Xj
Xjt==Region
Ü48T48
Coefficients: Estimatesv by
2 a, Bi, t-1

2 8, i = l 't>l (10)

Marginal Propensity Export
i = 1 i-7^j
to Import from Share
Other States (a) (5)

Note that the export effect for the later

New England 0.4660 0.2530
Mid-Atlantic 0.2610 1.0590
East North Central 0.1600 1.6810

West North Central 0.4630 0.2150
Southeast 0.4810 0.1620

Lower Atlantic 0.4900 0.1510

Kentucky-Tennessee 0.5130 0.0670
West South Central 0.4690 0.1990
Mountain 0.5090 0.1050

West Coast 0.4290 0.3490

round includes consideration of total real

benefits for the preceding round, since

the latter forms the basis for new imports

from all other states.

Rate of discount. The rate of discount
chosen implies some judgment about the

length of time between successive rounds

of benefits. Two possibilities were considered; the first where benefits are as-

sumed to be obtained instantaneously
(r = 0) and second, where benefits are

assumed to be worked out with a one-year

Source: See text.

time lag between rounds. For the second

possibility, an annual discount factor of 8

The share of total exports to be per
as- cent is used. In practice, there is
signed to each state is estimated in little
the difference in the results obtained
same fashion, with data from the same
with these two methods, therefore only
source, and therefore is subject to the
the latter possibility is retained for dis-

cussion below.
same set of weaknesses (see Table 1). First,
from the Haveman-Krutilla durable goodsFiscal data. Data for direct federal exrequirements for dam construction, deterand federal tax incidence used
mine the amount exported from thependitures
jth

here are taken from a 1968 study by
state as a fraction of total exports (8j).
Halper
and Labovitz.10 In that study, estiThen each state's share (Xj) of the total
mates of direct federal expenditures in
amount to be exported to all states may
states were made either on a basis of

be assumed as 8j
48
S Si
i=l

The total amount to which this fraction is

place of residence of the recipient of a
payment, or on a basis of the point at

which an activity or service is conducted.
In the case of military outlays, federal ex-

penditures were assigned to the state of

residence of the contractor or subcontracin round one for state j an amount equal to tor. For purposes of dividing federal reve-

applied is total imports by all states, i.e.,
48

E čví(Mi - Tj) (8)

i=l

hence first round exports by the j* state

are defined as

nues among states, reported collections
are used only for a few minor items in
favor of an among-state allocation of

"Harriet J. Halper and I. M. Labovitz, Federal Revenue and Expenditure Estimates for
States and Regions , Fiscal Years, 1965-67
(Washington,, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1968).
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Table 2. A Comparison of Per Capita Net Benefits fro
Budgetary Process Under Alternative Assumptions
Net Real Benefits Dollar Flow Including
Net Monetary ( Discounted at Employment Effect of
State (M-T) (Rank) (Amount) (Rank) (M - T-f-Ey) (Rank)
Alabama - 311 5 -242 10 - 291 5
Arizona - 466 22 -389 36 - 442 21
Arkansas - 266 4 - 203 8 - 251 4
California - 691 39 - 454 40 - 649 39
Colorado - 514 26 - 430 39 - 494 27
Connecticut - 914 47 - 686 47 - 889 47

Delaware -1,215 48 -998 48 - 1,199 48
Florida

Georgia

-

606

-

34

411

-470

42

-

589

34

-312

22

-

390

18

19

Idaho - 365 11 -311 21 - 350 12
Illinois - 774 44 -199 7 - 763 45
Indiana - 590 33 -160 3 - 579 33
Iowa - 450 21 -333 27 - 442 21

Kansas - 409 18 -296 17 - 392 19
Kentucky - 352 9 - 297 18 - 334 10
Louisiana - 343 8 - 258 12 - 324 8
Maine - 496 25 -373 32 - 474 24
Maryland - 721 43 - 567 45 - 693 43
Massachusetts - 697 41 - 531 44 - 673 40
Michigan - 695 40 - 206 9 - 683 41
Minnesota - 502 27 - 376 34 - 489 26
Mississippi

-

200

2

-

151

2

-

184

2

Missouri - 580 32 - 428 38 - 561 31
Montana - 352 9 -285 16 - 326 9

Nebraska - 411 19 - 301 19 - 398 20
Nevada - 713 42 - 624 46 - 683 41
New Hampshire - 630 36 - 473 43 - 620 36
New Jersey - 777 45 - 319 25 - 756 44
New Mexico - 328 7 - 260 14 - 299 6
New York - 825 46 - 332 26 - 808 46
North Carolina - 401 16 - 312 23 - 386 17
North Dakota - 172 1 - 109 1 - 147 1
Ohio - 637 37 -175 6 - 625 38

Oklahoma - 379 13 - 281 15 - 361
Oregon - 540 29 - 378 35 - 524
Pennsylvania - 637 37 - 258 13 - 623
Rhode Island - 619 35 - 461 41 - 593
South

South

Carolina

Dakota

-

-

326

6

-

236

3

-

247

13
29
37
35

11

168

5

Tennessee - 389 14 - 334 28 - 375 15

Texas - 468 23 - 347 30 - 449 23

Utah - 405 17 -339 29 - 381 16

Vermont

-

487

24

-

369

31

Virginia - 521 28 - 403 37 - 498
Washington - 561 30 - 374 33 - 533
West Virginia - 369 12 - 308 20 - 347
Wisconsin - 578 31 - 166 4 - 568

28
30
11
32

Wyoming - 391 15 - 319 24 - 367 14
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total federal receipts onfits
the
basis
of a grants
set as a measreplace
net monetary
of assumptions about the
ofbudgetary
var- process.
ure incidence
of the effect of the
ious types of tax.11 Federal
grants
States like Illinois,
Indiana,are
Michigan, New

Jersey, New
York, Ohio,
and Wisconsin
allocated to recipient states,
data
on the
all fare much
better
under the definition
latter being derived from
the
Annual
Report of the Secretaryofof
Treasury.
netthe
real benefits
developed here. For

All data are averagedexample,
over
years
on athe
straight
monetary basis Illi-

1965-67 and are analyzed
here
on taxes
a per
nois pays
in federal
$774 per capita
capita basis.
more than is returned in the form of grants
and expenditures, and ranks forty-fourth

Statistical Results

among the 48 states. But when the employment and import effects are intro-

State rankings . Table 2 presents rankduced, the net outflow reduces to $199 per
ings of states according to three measures
of the net income-redistributional effect capita, ranking Illinois seventh among
the 48 states. On the other hand, for Ariof the federal budgetary process: The first

is an estimate of net monetary grants,
defined as (M-T) and presented in column (1). The second, an estimate of total
net benefits as defined in equation (7)
above, is presented in column (2). In the

zona, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, New
Mexico, Tennessee, and Utah the reverse

is true - their relative positions are much
better before any account is taken of the
employment and trade effects.

The question now arises as to whether
these changes in rankings are due to the
to as net real benefits. Third, and in
order to isolate the relative importance inclusion of federal expenditures (the 'ex-

subsequent discussion, this will be referred

of the employment-generating effects of

direct federal expenditures, the measure
(M - T+Ey) is introduced in column (3).
It will be observed that the net redistributional effects are negative for each
state and for each measure used. There

penditure effect') in the calculation or to

the introduction of interstate trade (the

'trade effect'). The benefit measure listed
in column (3), which consists of net monetary grants plus federal expenditures, adjusted for the employment effect but not
for the trade effect, provides the answer.

are several reasons for this, the most important being the assumption that if state The similarity of rankings between this

money were retained it would approxi- measure and net monetary grants (colmate a federal grant (i.e., the whole umns (1) and (3)) shows that the 'trade

amount would be of intrinsic value to the

state itself) rather than an expenditure.

effect' is the one that exerts the prepon-

derant influence.

This negative effect is reinforced by the

Interstate income equalization. The refact that about YlVi per cent of federal
lationship between net monetary grants
expenditures could not be allocated by (M-T) and per capita income has the
state, this being only slightly offset by
predictable negative relationship with per
the fact of a budgetary deficit over the
three-year period considered.12

capita income, i.e.,

(M-T) =467.2-0.3540 YP
(5.372) (11.480)

Comparison of columns (1) and (2)

of Table 2 indicates a considerable dif-

ference in rankings when net real bene-

(Ř2 = .735) (II)13

nThe

au

tions
inh
Equation (11) indicates that
a $100 higher
and
expe

procedu
SerSer
35 capita
35 greater
greater
income
netnetmonetary
monetary
is associated
outflow.
outflow. with a
cit.,
pp.

The present value of net real benefits

A
.
.
«
12We
m
(B)
a
tures
as

benefit for the inhabitants of all states. More-

to

over, loans to the federal government by private individuals and organizations may be con- 13t-ratios are presented in parentheses below

sidered distributionally neutral.

the regression coefficients.
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IV. Conclusions

B = 79.25 -0.1535 YP
(0.676) (3.687)

The assumptions that had to be made
in order to make empirical testing possible

(R2 = .211) (12)

clearly leave a great deal to be desired.

In the case of both real benefits and
However, the foregoing analysis suggests
monetary grants the distribution of fed- that omission of parameters other than

eral aid is therefore shown to be equal-the flow of monetary grants and taxes is
izing, i.e., the smallest negative net bene-likely to lead policy-mäcers to make confits may be observed for states with the siderable errors in estimating the inter-

state distribution of the benefits of the
lowest per capita income. However, per
capita income is more systematically re-federal budgetary process.

lated to monetary flows than to real ben-

At present, we cannot predict, with any
efits. Moreover, the per capita incomeprecision,
the true interstate distribution

elasticity (?/) of real benefits is less than

of federal assistance, because data on the
that of the nominal benefits resulting

from federal tax/grant policy, i.e.,

=~um <13)
while

/Af - c(M - T)
3Yp (M-T)

7/(M-T)= /Af -

= -1.9068 (14)

crucial parameters - particularly those related to the 'trade effect' - are unknown.
We have already mentioned that previous

studies purporting to determine the in-

come-equalizing effect of the federal budget, probably succeed in conveying a better picture of budget-makers' intentions
than of the actual results of their activity.
Yp
This conclusion seems to be supported by
our results, in which the real redistributive

effect of the budgetary process appears

to be much weaker than a superficial comparison of federal taxes and grants-in-aid
That is, relative to any given percent difwould suggest.
ference in income, the percent difference

in real benefits is much less than that

observed in the case of monetary flows.
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